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This paper concerns Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts in concern to the coming 
new 2014/24IEU public procurement directive. The new EU public procurement 
directive gives the public authority the opportunity to negotiate PPPs much more when 
they are implemented in national law. An opportunity the member states should 
consider using when procuring a PPP. This paper looks at the negotiation and 
contracting of a PPP in an economic theoretical and EU public procurement perspective 
and discusses how to establish an efficient PPP contract under a strong public law 
doctrine. Governments should consider tendering out PPP projects in the spirit of joint 
utility because joint utility can increase the concept of more value for money; the 
cornerstone of the PPP concept. This paper discusses the positive gains from negotiation 
and compares it with the upcoming possibilities in the EU public procurement law. 
Furthermore, the paper seeks to establish a connection between public law, private law 
and the efficient PPP contract by drawing upon economic theory and empirical contract 
data from UK, US and Danish partnering contracts from the construction industry and 
the aim of contracting joint utility. Joint utility can increase the concept of more value 
for money; the cornerstone of the PPP concept. The paper draws upon existing legal 
content regarding collaboration and common goals and game theory to explain the 
benefits from implementing similar clauses in PPP contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
Under a presumption of market incentives, public-private partnerships 
seem to be more appropriate than hierarchical command 
relationships or adversarial regulatory processes. Nevertheless, 
successfi" implementation of public-private partnership depends to a 
large extent on the development of sound legal procedures, 
agreements and contracts that clearly define the relationship between 
government and private firms. 2 
N. Pongsiri 
This paper discusses efficient PPP contracts in terms of the coming 2014/24/EU public 
procurement directive with the assumption that a PPP should be similar to the private 
sector long-term strategic alliances or other long-term collaborative relationships. When 
negotiating the PPP contract, the parties must seek to obtain utility within the contract 
clauses. This paper discusses joint utility versus self-optimization in a game theoretical 
perspective and analyses how local or central governments can optimize the PPP 
contract by behaving, in order to obtain joint utility, in a PPP contractual relationship. 
For decades Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been used around the world in 
many different variations in different countries. The EU Member States have had very 
different perceptions on how to establish efficient PPP projects. Some with success 
while others, such as, for example, Denmark, have spent the last decade discussing 
whether or not is was possible to procure PPP under the EU public procurement law. 
The private market uses strategic alliances to increase quality and decrease cost, and, 
therefore, has increased the value for money for decades.3 The motivation behind a 
strategic alliance is to make a business arrangement that creates dynamism, 
collaboration, and mutual learning among the parties. Thus, the private sector met the 
consumer demand with new types of contracts including collaboration. 
The PPP contract used today in many EU Member States aims to fulfil the same 
demand,4 and PPPs have received a boost in various countries undergoing a process of 
significant economic growth. By using PPPs, it is possible to provide additional capital; 
to set up alternative management procedures and implementation skills; to provide 
value added to the consumer and the public at large; and to provide better identification 
of needs and optimal use of resources, if it is possible to negotiate an efficient contract. 5 
Years ago, PPP arrangements were often driven by limitations in public funds to 
cover investment needs. Today, PPPs are also driven by interest in increasing the 
quality and efficiency of public services in infrastructure projects, e.g. in sectors such as 
technology, infrastructure, energy, water, prisons, welfare, transport, public health, 
schools, urban regeneration, and national security6 and providing a wide range of public 
services, like telecommunication, plants, financial support, innovative financing, 
general public services, education, and research. 
2 N. Pongsiri, 'Regulation and public private partnership' (2002) 15 (2) International Journal of Public 
Sector Management 487-495, p. 489. 
3 Reuer, Jefferey, (ed.), Strategic alliances, Theory and evidence, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
4 N. Pongsiri, 'Regulation and public private partnership' (2002) 15(6) International Journal of Public 
Sector Management 487-495, pp. 487-495 . 
5 See Commission (EC), 'Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships' March 2003, p. 4. 
6 D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private Partnerships, The worldwide Revolution in infrastructure 
provision and project finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2007), pp. 8-10. 
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Short definition of PPP: long term collaboration contract based upon an increase in shared information, 
flipping the incentives, total cost perspective, alternative to traditional contracting out contract and 
procurement, creation of dynamism, risk diversity/ efficient use of core competencies and the creation of 
more value for the tax payer's money by using private funding to solve public tasks.8 
In the end, all of these factors can fulfill the main scope of a PPP agreement, which is to 
ensure joint utility between the parties, thereby ensuring the most efficient product at 
the lowest price. 
A PPP therefore has more to it than just the financing element. The relationship has 
to build on co-operation, trust and demands, so that the parties can create the best and 
most efficient product. 
From an inter-contractual perspective, a PPP must be based on co-operation, because 
the aim of a PPP is to provide a mechanism for developing a public service provision 
involving significant assets or services over a relatively long period of time. From an 
institutional perspective, a PPP focuses on turning around the ~arties' traditional 
incentives to create more, and better, value for tax payers' money, by, for example, 
basing the contract on needs instead of demands. 
2. EU public procurement law and PPP 
The first legal challenge in respect to a full use and benefit of a PPP is that a PPP often 
falls under the public procurement rules and legislation, and that none of those rules are 
set up specifically to cover the purpose of a PPP arrangement. 
In 2004, the EU public procurement legislation was made with traditional public contracts in mind, based 
on different measures than the PPP. The EU Commission did not comment on the problem that a large 
part of the traditional EC procurement rules in the 2004/IS/EC Directive lO are made to cover the 
traditional procurement arrangement and not the new construction of co-operation between a public and 
private party. II 
The successful procurement and implementation of a PPP depends on the legal public 
procurement procedures. The contracts between the parties must fulfil the demands of 
the public procurement law and, as such, there is little flexibility for the parties to 
negotiate further demands. 
The old EU public procurement rules did in general not promote or support the idea 
of co-operation and it seemed as if the EU Commission believed that it was possible to 
accommodate all new ideas and needs, to create new types of co-operation between 
7 The distribution of risks between the public partner and the private partner is different. The risks 
generally borne by the public sector are transferred to the private party if this is efficient with regards to 
the transaction and the project. 
8 Value for money means: reducing the cost and price; increasing the quality; reducing the risks and 
failures; improving the co-ordination; and sharing responsibility and capacity. 
9 See also M. Burnett, Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) - a Decision Maker's Guide (Maastricht: 
Institut Europeen d' Administration Publique, 200S). 
10 See Council Directive (EC) 2004/IS on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ LI34/114, as amended. 
II See Commission (EC), 'Communication on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public 
Procurement and Concessions' (Communication) COM (2005) 569 final, 15th November 2005, section 
2.3. 
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public and private parties, and to cover all situations created by the market without 
negotiation. 
Now, however, the new 2014/24IEU directive on public procurement indicates that 
the EU Commission has taken into consideration that PPPs have very specific 
characteristics with regard to the co-operation acknowledged some degree of 
negotiation in the new directive besides the first priority of an open market, 
competItion, equal treatment, elimination of corruption, transparency, non-
discrimination, proportionality, effective public procurement and maintaining market 
interest. From a legal perspective, this, a more flexible approach, has been requested for 
many years. The research literature has discussed the necessity of legal support and 
clear rules of PPP arrangements even before the 2004/18/EF public procurement 
directive. Pongsiri argued, in regard to developing countries, that: 
"Regulation is a key element to maintain competitive market discipline in public service provisions in 
developing countries. While many governments in developing countries have already signed their first 
demonstration public private partnership contracts mist have not yet designed the legal and regulatory 
framework for monitoring the performance of private contractors and for ensuring contractual 
compliance." 12 
"Regulatory systems should be established as soon as possible to define clear rules for financial 
performance, provide practical experiences to the staff responsible for their implementation, and provide 
assurance to the private sector that the regulatory system includes protection from expropriation, 
arbitration of commercial disputes, and respect for contracts agreements. 13 
By the new public procurement directive 2014/24/EU the EU Commission seems to 
have recognised that there is a great need for contracting authorities to have additional 
flexibility in choosing a procurement procedure, which allows for negotiations. 14 
"Member States should be able to provide for the use of the competitive procedure with negotiation or the 
competitive dialogue, in various situations where open or restricted procedures without negotiations are 
not likely to lead to satisfactory procurement outcomes. It should be recalled that use of the competitive 
dialogue has significantly increased in terms of contract values over the past years. It has shown itself to 
be of use in cases where contracting authorities are unable to define the means of satisfying their needs or 
of assessing what the market can offer in terms of technical, financial or legal solutions. This situation 
may arise in particular with innovative projects, the implementation of major integrated transport 
infrastructure projects, large computer networks or projects involving complex and structured 
financing." 15 
It should, however, be noted that the competitive procedure with negotiation is not 
available in all cases. For works contracts competitive procedure with negotiation 
cannot be used to procure standard buildings, but it is possible to use negotiation if the 
work includes design or innovative solutions. Moreover, the competitive procedure with 
negotiation could be available in cases where an open or restricted procedure resulted 
only in irregular or unacceptable tenders. 16 Furthermore, the public authority should 
observe the principles of equal treatment and transparency, in particular some minimum 
12 N. Pongsiri, 'Regulation and public private partnership' (2002) 15(6) International Journal of Public 
Sector Management 487-495, p. 490. 
13 N. Pongsiri, 'Regulation and public private partnership' (2002) 15(6) International Journal of Public 
Sector Management 487-495, p. 490. 
14 Directive 20 14/24/EU, preamble no. 42. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, preamble 44. 
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requirements characterizing the specific nature of the procurement and the award 
criteria and their weighting must not be changed in the negotiations, in order to 
guarantee equal treatment of all economic operators. 17 The EU Commission also 
stresses the importance of ensuring that the negotiations are used as tools to require 
fulfillment of specific needs. 
The acknowledgement of a procedure allowing some degree of negotiation in the 
2014/24/EU directive was very much needed, especially in regard to PPPs. The 2014 
directive does not explicitly mention PPPs in the text, but PPPs seem to be included in 
the phrase in preamble 42: 
..... in particular with innovative projects, the implementation of major integrated transport 
infrastructure projects, involving complex and structured financing ". 
Thus, it is important that public parties acknowledge that the PPP objectives result in a 
shift of content in the contract. Normally, a traditional public contract is based on 
demands and concrete descriptions. To fulfil its objectives, the PPP contract focuses on 
needs and functions, and it must be built on trust, transparency by open books, and co-
operation between the parties. With the 2014/24/EU directive, the strongest barrier to 
PPPs - the ban on negotiation - is removed. 
Through the right negotiation in the procurement process it is possible, under the 
new public procurement directive, to ensure that the private party will be responsible for 
the funding, design, completion, implementation, service and maintenance,18 the 
incentive to build to reduce the life-time cost of service and maintenance. Thus, the PPP 
concept provides the contractor with a compelling reason to create the cheapest building 
or infrastructure for a period of 20 to 30 years to regain the investment. 
3. Negotiating an efficient PPP 
The observation regarding the need for negotiation by the EU Commission is 
significant. Negotiation is a relevant tool when aiming at an efficient contract. The 
former implicit ban on negotiation derived from the 2014 public procurement directive 
was extremely problematic in regard to PPPs; the ban on negotiation is now abolished 
or at least downgraded with the 2014/24/EU directive. The ban on negotiation prevented 
the specific economic gains from PPPs. 
From an economic point of view, negotiation is an important issue when two or 
more parties wish to create a model for co-operation. 
Short version of the Coase Theorem,19 to illustrate the importance of negotiation towards joint utility: 
Farmer A lives next to farmer B. Farmer A grows com on some of her land and leaves some of the land 
uncultivated. Farmer B runs cattle on all his land. There is no fence between the two ranches, but the 
boundary is clear. Thus, from time to time farmer B's cattle wander into farmer A's property and damage 
farmer A's com. From a legal point of view, farmer B would then have to pay farmer A for the damage to 
the com. With regards to future damage, farmer B must build a fence around his land to keep the cattle 
inside his own property and, by that measure, ensure that future damage will not occur. If instead the two 
farmers, in a world without transaction cost, used another approach than the traditional legal solution, one 
17 Ibid, preamble 45. 
18 See Commission (EC), 'Green Paper on public-private partnershi~s and Community Law on Public 
Contracts and Concessions' (Green Paper), COM (2004) 327 final, 301 April 2004. 
19 Ronald Coase, The problem of the social cost, 1960 (Coase theorem) based on Cooter and Ulen, Law 
and Economics, 6th ed. London: Addison-Wesley, 2014. 
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could imagine a solution where the two farmers fell in love and got married. Such a decision would imply 
that the farmers combined their business interests, and, therefore, their joint profits. The joint profit would 
then be highest if they were to build a small fence around the cornfield. This would be the best value for 
money in this specific situation and the optimal joint solution. 20 If the farmers did not fall in love but were 
just neighbours deciding to negotiate the best value for money, in a world without transaction cost, the 
two farmers still could end up with a more efficient solution than the legal solution if they negotiated. 
This idea of negotiation is fundamental in relation to optimal contracts21 in, for example PPP's. 
Based on the Coase-theorem, the parties concerned are the best placed to negotiate the 
risk and the value of this risk. If the public party in the tender notice already sets up the 
distribution of the risk as demanded by the public procurement law, the project cannot 
create the best value for money. 
4. The efficient PPP contract 
The efficient PPP is dependent on negotiation and a well-functioning interrelationship 
between the parties. The interrelationship depends on both the task, and the contract 
regarding the project. 
Regardless of the contract type, economic theory considers contracts as (Pareto) 
optimal if the following conditions are met. Given a set of alternative allocations of 
goods or outcomes for a set of individuals, a change from one allocation to another that 
can make at least one individual better off without making any other individual worse 
off, is called a 'Pareto improvement'. An allocation is defined as 'Pareto efficient' or 
'Pareto optimal' when no further Pareto improvements can be made.22 
Game theory can be used to argue that: 
"For individuals pursuing their own self-interest, incentives for co-operation will be greater than for 
selfish behavior . , . under a wide variety of circumstances, including when the "partners" are hostile" .23 
Game Theory and the prisoner's dilemma24 can be explained by the following example, 
using applied economics and not involving economic theory:25 
Two people have been arrested in possession of some stolen goods. The prosecutor has enough evidence 
to have them prosecuted and convicted for possession of stolen goods, unless one or both of them confess 
to burglary. If the prosecutor only prosecutes the persons for being in possession of stolen property, it will 
lead to a lower penalty than the burglaries. The two people, now known as the prisoners, are put in 
isolation and therefore cannot talk to each other. Each prisoner is visited by the prosecutor, and each gets 
the same deal. If the prisoner confesses and by that also gives evidence about the other prisoner, he 
20 See further Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th ed. London: Addison-Wesley, 2014. 
21 See, for example, 1. Macneil, The New Social Contract (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); 
and K. W. Artz and T. H. Bruch, 'Asset specificity, uncertainty and relational norms' (2000) 41 Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 337-362. 
22 Steven Shavell, 'Contracts', in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 436. 
23 R. W. McQuaid, 'The theory of partnerships: why have partnership?', in S. P. Osborne (ed), Public-
Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 
27. 
24 See A. Rapoport, ' Prisoners' Dilemma and Game Theory' , in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 100. 
25 The application of this economic example does not include all conditions and presumptions in the 
prisoner's dilemma game and the game theory. 
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himself will go free while the other receives the maximum sentence of four years. If both prisoners 
confess, they will each get two years in prison for burglary. 
If neither confesses, each prisoner will get a half-year in prison for possession of stolen goods because the 
break-in cannot be proved?6 






0, -4 - 3, - 3 
Defects 
'Confession' is the dominant strategy because 'confession' is the optimal choice for each player, 
regardless of what the other player does. Prisoners I and 2 are in the same situation and have the same 
information. Thus, the game ends by both payers spending two years in prison instead of only half a 
year.27 
The prisoner's dilemma can be seen as an illustration of the difference between 
individual and collective rationality. Decisions that seem rational from the individual's 
perspective are irrational when seen with common eyes, even though an outsider can see 
the rational gains from a common perspective.28 
The objectives regarding PPPs can be explained by the game theory. The 
collaborative contracts were introduced as an alternative to traditional construction 
contracts. The aim was to ensure that the parties would optimise the transaction instead 
of their own profit. Thus, the parties must optimise the joint utility and not only their 
own utility. To obtain this objective, the parties must share all information relevant to 
the project and work with open books and calculations. The relationship must be built 
on co-operation and trust. 
If a PPP relationship is based on these economic factors, it is possible to move the 
output from the Nash equilibrium to the Pareto optimal situation in the matrix. But the 
parties need legal solutions to obtain this situation. 
26 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th ed. London: Addison-Wesley, 2014. 
27 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th ed. London: Addison-Wesley, 2014. 
28 A. Rapoport, 'Prisoners' Dilemma and Game Theory', in P. Newman (ed.), The New Pa/grave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 100. 
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The benefits or advantages of setting up a well-functioning PPP are: 29 
Collaborative advantages Economic advantages 
Increase the quality Reduced whole life costs and price 
Reduce the failures More optimal risk allocation 
Improve the co-ordination Improvement of the incentives to perform 
Share capacity with the private party Generation of additional revenues in the private sectors 
Faster implementation Transferring responsibility 
Improve the quality of service Increasing investments in general 
Acceleration of infrastructure provision Higher efficiency in the use of resources by joint utilities 
Enhanced public management Generating commercial value from public sector assets 
A well-functioning PPP is highly reliant on the ability of the parties to set up the 
incentive structure in the right way. Part of a functioning incentive scheme is when the 
supplier bears the right amount of risks, on the grounds that those with money at stake 
have an incentive to make the efficient decision. 30 In the end, all these factors can fulfill 
the main scope of a PPP agreement, which is to ensure joint utility between the parties, 
thereby ensuring the most efficient product at the lowest price. 
6. PPP and partnering contracts - from self to joint utility - in a private law 
perspective 
From a contractual point of view, it is a general rule in civil-and common- law countries 
that parties have contractual freedom. The reason behind the freedom of contract is 
individual autonomy and public benefit. The contract is binding upon the parties and 
determines the rights and liabilities.31 
The principle is a product of a liberalist belief that when the individual is free from 
historical constraints and authorities, the individual is capable of determining his acts 
and responsibilities, and thereby the person can decide whether or not to make a 
contract. 32 
PPPs can learn from the contractual evidences from partnering contracts. As 
mentioned above, ACA (British Association of Consultant Architects)33 developed a 
Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering34 as a multiple party agreement called 
29 See also OECD, Public-Private Partnerships, in pursuit of risk sharing and value for money (Paris: 
OECD, 2008), p. 37 and Commission (EC), 'Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships' 
March 2003, pp. 15-16. 
30 See also D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private Partnerships, The worldwide Revolution in 
infrastructure provision and project finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2007), p. 247. 
31 W. Flume, The General Part of Civil Law, Vol. 2: The Transaction, (4th ed., Berlin: Springer, 1992), p. 
7 
32 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An introduction to comparative law (3 edn., Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), p. 
324. 
33 ACA has allowed the author of this paper to the analyse and refer to the PPC2000- Project Partnering 
Contract. 
34 PPC2000, amended 2008, ACA standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering, Construction 
Excellence in the build environment, Construction Industry Council, ACA and Towers & Hamlins LLP, 
2008, by Dr. David Mosey. 
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PCC 2000 (amended 2008 Project Partnering Contract-2000) regardin~ large projects.35 
The Danish BYG-partnering standard form is similar to the PCC 2000. 6 One significant 
difference is, that PCC 2000 is a complete contractual form compared to the BYG 
partnering contract, which is linked to the traditional Construction Agreement 
documents in Denmark. 
The Danish BYG partnering agreement 2005 has 11 clauses with sub clauses and 
refers to the construction law in general, excluding some clauses not compatible with 
the partnering concept. The PCC 2000 consists of more than 65 pages and includes 
more than 10 pages of individual clause, 34 pages on standard clauses and 5 pages with 
legal definitions and an appendix. 
It is not allowed to quote from the PCC 2000 contract, which is why specific quotes 
are not possible in this paper. Permission to explain and compare with the Danish 
partnering regime has been given personally from the publisher to the author of this 
paper. 
The PPC2000 partnering contract was the first British agreed document to involve 
more than two parties. The legally binding37 document includes all parts of the 
construction - from design to delivery.38 By the PPC2000 contract the parties commit 
themselves to collaborate, to show trust towards each other, to be fair and to work with 
the common purpose of the project at hand,39 as a result of this the parties cannot work 
just to optimise their own utility. Furthermore, the parties are obliged to ensure 
transparency and share all project relevant information,40 open books and calculations,41 
to create and fulfil common goals42 and needs.43 All characteristics are comparable to 
the Danish BYG partnering paradigm, which holds the same clauses and is a multiple 
party contract. 
The purpose of the British partnering contract is to obtain ajoint economic benefit 
with a common goal, defined as: 
"The first approach essentially sees partnering as a tool for improving the performance of the 
construction process and emphasises the way it helps to create synergy and maximize the effectiveness of 
each participant's resources... Secondly, partnering has been seen as a management process ... to 
improve the efficiency of large construction projects ... as a variant of total quality management ... the 
formation of a project team with a common set of goals. Finally, others have focused on the contractual 
and relationship implications of partnering. seeing it as a way of "putting the handshake back into doing 
business" ... ,,44 
35 Richard DartnelJ, Construction Law (2007) 18, 3, p. 23, I sl of April 2007. PPC2000 was in 2006 used 
on works at more than 8 Billion Pound in Great Britain. 
36 David Mosey, Construction Law (2007) 18, 2, I sl of Marts 2007, p. 6. 
37 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 2.3. 
38 In 2005 ACA developed another partnering contract calJed TPC2005 including a public party. David 
Mosey, Construction Law (2009) 20, 3, p. 23, I st of April 2009. 
39 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 1.3. 
40 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 3.1. 
41 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 10.1(i). 
42 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 4.1 (i). 
43 PPC2000, amended 2008, § 10.1 (ii). 
44 Barlow, Cohen, Jashapara and Simpson, Towards positive partnering, Revealing the realities in the 
construction industry, the Policy Press, University of Bristol, 2002, p. 6. 
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The American purpose of the partnering concept is similar to the British concept, and 
focuses on the common objectives regarding the maximisation of the effectiveness of 
the resources and the common goals: 
..... Partnering is a long-term commitment between two or more organizations for the purpose of 
achieving specific business objectives by maximising the effectiveness of each participant's resources. 
This requires changing traditional relationships to a shared culture without regard to organizational 
boundaries. The relationship is based upon trust. dedication to common goals. and an understanding of 
each other's individual expectations and values. "./5 
In this regard, it is most relevant that the parties must ensure a change in behaviour 
compared to traditional contracts, and dedicate themselves to the common goal, as 
defined later on as, joint utility. 
In Denmark, several definitions of partnering can be found. The most important one 
is found in the BYG partnering paradigm BYG's,46Partnering i praksis 2005. This 
paradigm is a legally binding47 multiple party agreement based on common goals, open 
books, on-going negotiation to solve the needs and functions, trust and collaboration. 
"There is fulI transparency about the economy, and all parties have a responsibility to ensure that the 
budget is held and is committed to optimizing the economy in order to achieve higher earnings / savings 
for alI parties" (translated text) . ./H 
7. Contracting efficient PPP 
The PPP contract is a legal setup promoting long term relational commitments among 
two or more parties, such as, for example, a strategic alliances or a multiple party 
construction contract. The parties must shift from being parties to being partners, a 
significant tool for maximising the output from a long-term strategic alliance. Sharing 
information is also a relevant alliance tool together with the relational norms such as 
trust, collaboration and incentives, and also tools in strategic alliances that are used to 
create a competitive advantage.49 
Looking at the game theory argument in the Prisoners Dilemma game, joint utility 
will create the highest possible output, but the game will still end up in an inefficient 
Nash Equilibrium, due to the fact that the parties will end up self-optimising even 
though this will end in the worst possible economic output. 
The most significant difference between a traditional contracting out agreement and a 
PPP contract is the objective concerning joint utility. Both traditional contracts and 
45 US-Construction Industry Institute's Partnering Task Force, Construction Industry Institute, 1991, In 
search ofpartnering exceIlence, Austin, Texas, CII, University of Texas, p. 2. 
46 Danish BYG partnering paradigm, 2005. 
47 Section 4, in BYG partnering paradigm, 2005, "Aftalens parter fOlpligter sig til at handle i 
overensstemmelse med intentionerne i nceI'Vcerende aftale. 
48 Original text: "Der er fuld abenhed om okonomien. og aile parter er medansvarlige for at sikre. at 
okonomien holdes indenfor budgetrammen og er forpligtet til at medvirke til at optimere okonomien med 
henblik pa at opna en oget indtjening/besparelse for aile parter. "Section 6.2 in BYG partnering 
paradigm. 2005. 
49 Matton van den Berg and Peter Kamminga, (2006). Optimising contracting for alIiances in 
infrastructure projects. The International Construction Law Review, 2006,59-77. 
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contract law in general are based on the idea of self-optimisation. Every party will 
optimise their own utility.5o 
The negotiations of the PPP contract must result in a joint goal benefitting, or 
removing the opposing interests among, the parties. When optimising the project or the 
transaction, the parties can focus on a common interest instead of their own interest. For 
example, in a traditional building contract the building owner will demand the lowest 
price and the contractor will set the highest possible prize. 5 I 
The PPP contract must seek to create a Pareto improvement and share the benefits 
among the parties. 52 
In a traditional contract the supplier is obliged to deliver the asset at the right time, 
place and condition, otherwise he/she will be in breach of contract. The asset owner will 
deliver the right payment at the right time and place. Neither of the parties have an 
incentive to deliver a better solution than agreed upon. In a PPP contract the parties 
should be obliged to improve the asset by working to fulfil the needs instead of specific 
demands. By collaborating they can create the solutions to the demand by using lower 
cost and resources. From a game theory perspective, the parties can obtain a higher 
output by joint utility but will not. They will end up in an inefficient Nash equilibrium 
only possible to escape by the legally binding PPP contract. 
The basis of PPP contracts is to create more value for money, and a well-functioning 
PPP contract should implement the following contract elements:53 
Material clauses Process-based clauses 
The parties share all economic information The parties optimise the transaction, 
regarding the transaction. The parties optimise joint utility 
They have open books and accounts 
Contracting on needs The relationship is built on: 
Contracting on common goals Co-operation 
Contracting on allocating risk and responsibility Transparency 
to the efficient party. Trust 
The parties educate all involved staff on PPP Workshops and processes are agreed upon 
(including back office) ex ante and involves all parties from T=O 
The prisoner's dilemma game illustrates that two individuals will not cooperate even 
when it is obvious that it is in their best interests to do so. Furthermore, the prisoner's 
dilemma game illustrates that defecting is always chosen in preference to cooperation. 
50 The lawyers will optimise their clients utility and by that their own utility. The client will control the 
lawyer/negotiators capability to obtain the highest payoff regarding one self and the law behind all types 
of contract will support this perspective. 
51 As mentioned above, economic theory cons ider contracts as Pareto Optimal when "if the contract is 
impossible to modify (within the class of contracts) so as to raise the expected utility of both of the 
parties. Shave II, Contracts, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, p. 436. 
52 This paper does not consider the economic fair share among the parties but will just recommend using 
the theory behind initial investments and the theory on law and economic theory, see further Grossman & 
Hart, Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 94,1986, p. 691-719. 
53 See also Tvarn0, 'Law and Regulatory Aspects of Public-Private Partnerships: Contract Law and 
Public Procurement Law', in G. Hodge, A. Hodge, C. Greve and A. Boardman (eds.), International 
Handbook On Public-Private Partnerships (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), chapter 10. 
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The reason is that a rational self-interested person evaluates their own options in 
consideration with the other party's possible choice, knowing that the rational self-
interested counterparts do the same - in this scenario the only possible outcome 
therefore is not to cooperate but to defect. The risk of being defected by the other person 
is too great. An efficient PPP contract can solve this economic inefficiency by making 
the parties acknowledge the concept and benefit of joint utility and by creating a legally 
binding framework making the parties chose the right strategy without being caught in 
the dilemma between joint and self-optimisation. 
The obligation to have open books and calculations is a significant condition if the 
parties are to reach the benefit from joint utility. If the parties do not share all relevant 
information and fear that the other party will reveal their information, self-optimisation 
will occur at once. Full information can increase the possibility of cheating and self-
optimising. 54 
Trust and collaboration, as well as open books and joint utility, are obligations to be 
delivered on the same conditions as delivering the building and payment. Open books 
and calculations increases the amount of information shared and, by that, information 
regarding prices, costs, payments, salaries, discounts, savings, earnings, etc.55 The 
higher degree of information shared, the larger is the possibility to achieve joint utility. 
Information also decreases moral hazard and adverse selection and the risk of hold ups. 
Information is a key element to increase the output of the transaction and for the 
transaction to be legally binding the parties are to reveal information regarding the 
transaction, and the closer to joint utility the parties get. 56 
Game theory has shown some relevant theoretical information in regard to situations 
in which the economic agent or contract party faces a decision concerning a conflict of 
interest in which the agent or contract party must choose a strategy. Many similar 
decisions must be taken every day in contracting, negotiation, employment, pricing, 
buying, selling, collaborating etc. - situations, where persons must consider whether to 
behave in a certain way or not.57 
The specific clauses in both the Danish BYG and the British PCC 2000 contracts 
consist of binding agreements requiring the building owner to describe the needs and 
functions, and the constructor and design enterprises together with the building owner to 
collaborate on common goals and to use positive incentives to obtain the goals instead 
of negative clauses on breach and damages. Furthermore, the clauses are binding the 
parties to open books, calculations and trust. 
The long-term intention of the PPP contract is to stretch out the length of the contract 
to create the framework for the on-going negotiations in order to seek the most optimal 
solutions on the future challenges in the transaction. 
When building on needs and functions, the design and constructor do not have any 
specifications to fulfil but must fulfil a more uncertain goal: 
54 Tvam0, Partneringaftalens srerIige karakteristika, UFR nr. 45, 8. November 2003, p. 366. 
55 Section 6.2 in BYG partnering paradigm: "Der er fuld obenhed om @konomien. og aile parter er 
medansvarlige for at sikre. at @konomien holdes indenfor blldgetrammen og er forpligtet til at - medvirke 
til at optimere @konomien med henblik po at opml en @get indtjening/besparelse for aile parter ... " 
56 Steven Shavell, Contracts, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, p. 433. 
57 Robert Cooter og Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 5th edition, Pearson/Addison-Wesley, 2008, p. 
38. 
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A goal negotiated along the way by using the joint utility perspective in the PPP contract. 
A very different perspective compared to a traditional works contract. 
As for traditional contracts the PPP contract is the legal rule among the parties and by 
that the legal reality even though the framework differs from the contract law doctrine.58 
It is necessary, to make the parties legally bound to joint utility by the PPP contract. If 
not, the game theory has shown, that it is too risky to joint optimise and too tempting to 
self-optimise. The risk of being cheated is too big if the parties are not bound by the 
contract. When using positive incentives and positive pay offs, the PPP contract signals 
to share the common benefits from joint utility and makes it possible to gain, as shown 
by the prisoners dilemma game. 
Thus, the more soft social clauses, concerning collaboration, trust, common goals, 
joint utility, open books, and incentives, must be as binding as the obligation to deliver 
and pay.59 
The Governments should6o implement the above-mentioned elements into a proposal 
for a PPP contract in the procurement and demand for proposals to improve the PPP 
contract in the procurement notice. Such public behaviour invites to negotiation and 
signals true will to collaborate regarding the important change in the incentives on a 
long-term basis. 61 Furthermore, the aim of the contract must be that both the public and 
the private party benefit from such a contractual relationship, which is why the 
performance shall be based on needs instead of demands and ex ante requirements 
specifications. Thus, the contract should not state exactly what the private party must 
perform; rather, it should state which needs the end product must fulfi1. 62 
Compared to two private parties negotiation a contract under contractual freedom, a 
public and a private party cannot agree on what they want. 63 When a public party enters 
into a contract with private parties, public law in general and public procurement law in 
specifics must be followed when negotiating with the private bidders. 
This restriction from the public law in general conduct limitations to the concept of 
PPPs in specific and collaborative contracts in general, and even if the public sector is 
keen on a new contract model, a public party cannot benefit as much from negotiation 
as two private parties. 
In a perfect world, the function of a legal framework regarding PPPs would reduce 
opportunistic tendencies and opportunistic behavior between the parties. At the same 
S8 Tvarn0, Loyalitetspligt og partneringaftaler, Julebog 2002, ed. Ruth Nielsen, DJ0F, p. 149. 
S9 Tvarn0, Partneringaftalens srerlige karakteristika, UFR nr. 45, 8. november 2003 p. 366. 
60 The public authority also will face a number of other challenges. See for this subject M. Burnett, 
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) - A Decision Maker's Guide (Maastricht: Institut Europeen 
d' Administration Publique, 2008), p. 116. 
61 J. Barlow, M. Cohen, A. Jasphapara and Y. Simpson, Towards Positive Partnering: Revealing the 
Realities in the Construction Industry (Bristol: The Policy Press, 1997); Y. L. Dos and G. Hamel, 
Alliance Advantage. The art of creating value through Partnering (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard 
Business School Press, 1998); and E. E. Scheuing, The Power of Strategic Partnering (Portland: 
Productivity Press, 1995). 
62 For further discussions and analyses of Danish PPP arrangements, see C. D. Tvarn0, 'Public-Private 
Partnerships from a Danish perspective' (2006) Public Procurement Law Review NA98; C. D. Tvam0, 
PPP and Public service Broadcasting (Copenhagen: Julebog, 2005), pp. 181-201; c. D. Tvarn0, 'Public 
private partnership in the European Union', in R. Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public 
Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Dj0f, 2005), pp. 183-194. 
63 H Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 304. 
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time, the legal framework would reduce the fear of opportunistic behavior among the 
parties and align the interest of the partners. 64 
Other economic theories can explain the problems with the existence of a fear of 
opportunistic behaviour in a contractual relationship. In his transaction cost theory, 
Williamson explains that opportunistic behaviour is negatively related to safeguards,65 
and Gulati argues that this fear reflects a negative departure from the full change of co-
operative relationships maintained by organisations.6 
It is necessary to acknowledge that one of the key elements in a PPP is the co-
operation between the private and public party. 
8. Final remarks 
In regard to the public law and public procurement law, the law must ensure the 
possibility of establishing efficient collaborations between the public and the private 
sector. The future legal EU framework must also favor PPPs and not bring to much 
'baggage' from past decades; baggage arisen on the traditional contracting out 
experience, tender procedures, rules, contract terms, etc., because this can result in a 
situation in which the service provider is 'covering his back', acting more concerned 
with meeting the performance criteria in the contract than seeking real benefits. Such 
behavior can lead to a breakdown in the relationship, and, therefore, the trust and co-
operation foundation.67 An opportunistic breakdown will lead to self-optimizing 
behavior, which is the opposite of the joint utility. 
The game theory can, as described and analysed above, among other things show 
how to optimise long term relational contracts as for example a PPP contract. The tool 
is a legally binding PPP contract that sets the stage to optimise the transaction. As 
illustrated by the prisoner's dilemma game, the joint utility gives a significant larger pay 
off-compared to the game in which the parties self-optimise as shown in the matrix by 
the -~, -~ pay-off. 
When entering into a PPP contract, the parties must accept a set of rules to govern 
the process to obtain joint utility by open books and calculations preventing the risk of 
creating asymmetrical information. If not, the relationship could end up in an inefficient 
Nash Equilibrium. The same could occur if the parties do not include a clause regarding 
specific payment derived from fulfilling positive incentives, the risk of being excluded 
from sharing the benefit from joint utility might move the parties towards self-
optimisation and the inefficient Nash Equilibrium. 
641. Hennart, 'A Transaction Cost Theory of Equity Joint Ventures' (1998) 9 (4) Strategic Management 
Journal 361-374. 
65 O. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1975). 
66 R Gulati, 'The Dynamics of Alliance Formation, Dissertation' 54, Abstract International, p. 4170. 
67 See also: A. 1. Edkins and H. J. Smyth, 'Contractual Management in PPP Projects' (2006) Journal of 
Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice 82-93, at p.85. 
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